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A monotone game is a multistage game in which no player can lower her action in
any period below its previous level. A motivation for the monotone games of this paper
is dynamic voluntary contribution to a public project. Each player’s utility is a strictly
concave function of the public good, and quasilinear in the private good. The main result is
a description of the limit points of (subgame perfect) equilibrium paths as the period length
shrinks. The limiting set of such pro￿les is equal to the undercore of the underlying static
game ￿ the set of pro￿les that cannot be blocked by a coalition using a smaller pro￿le.
A corollary is that the limiting set of achievable pro￿les does not depend on whether the
players can move simultaneously or only in a round-robin fashion. The familiar core is
the ef￿cient subset of the undercore; hence, some but not all pro￿les that are ef￿cient and
individually rational can be nearly achieved when the period length is small. As the period
length shrinks, any core pro￿le can be achieved in a ￿twinkling of the eye￿ ￿ neither real-
time gradualism nor inef￿ciency are necessary.
KEYWORDS: dynamic games, monotone games, core, public goods, voluntary contribu-
tion, gradualism
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Amonotonegameisamultistagegame, withorderedstagegameactions, inwhichnoplayercan
ever choose an action lower than the one she chose in the previous period. This paper is about
a certain class of such games, in a setting with an in￿nite horizon and discounted payoffs. The
goal is to characterize their pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes and payoffs,
especially when the period length is small.
The irreversibility of a monotone game arises in many settings.1 An especially prominent
one is that of dynamic voluntary contribution, along the lines of Marx and Matthews (2000).
Agents in this scenario contribute amounts of a private good each period to a project, which
uses the total contribution accumulated to date as capital to produce public goods. Think of
a fund drive, or a never-ending sequence of fund drives, to ￿nance university buildings or a
charity. Each player’s cumulative contribution can only increase over time, thereby generating
the monotonicity.
In keeping with this motivation, the stage game payoffs in this paper are those of a neoclas-
sical public goods model. They are quasilinear in private good consumption, and the valuation
functions for the total amount contributed are strictly concave and differentiable. Each player’s
marginal valuation is low enough that she will never want to unilaterally increase her contribu-
tion, regardless of the level of past contributions. This prisoners’ dilemma feature distinguishes
the setting from the literature in which the public good has a threshold provision point, as is
discussed below.
An equilibrium path is a nondecreasing sequence of action/contribution pro￿les. Much of
this paper concerns the limits of (pure strategy subgame perfect) equilibrium paths, the ￿equi-
librium limit pro￿les￿. A path will spend all but a ￿nite number of periods near its limit, and so
the limiting pro￿les have an important role when discounting is low.
The main result is that as the period length goes to zero, the set of equilibrium limit pro￿les
expands and converges essentially to the ￿undercore￿ of the underlying coalitional game.2 The
undercore is de￿ned like the familiar core, except that a contribution pro￿le can only be blocked
1Consider, for example, ￿rms irrevocably making entry or standards-adoption decisions over time, as in Gale
(1995) or Ochs and Park (2004). Or countries negotiating treaties to progressively lower tariff or pollution levels, as
in Lockwood and Zissimos (2005).
2Technically, the set of equilibrium limit pro￿les converges to the ￿strict undercore￿, the closure of which is the
undercore. See Theorem 3.
1with a (component-wise) smaller pro￿le. That is, a pro￿le is ￿underblocked￿, by a coalition
if there exists a smaller pro￿le that each coalition member prefers, and which prescribes zero
contributionsforthenonmembers. Theundercoreisthesetofpro￿lesthatarenotunderblocked.
This characterization has several consequences. First, it implies that some ef￿cient pro￿les
can be nearly achieved as equilibrium limit pro￿les when the period length is small. This is
because the undercore contains the core, and any core pro￿le is ef￿cient. (The core is nonempty
here, containing, e.g., the Lindahl pro￿le.)
Second, if the number of players is three or more, then generally some pro￿les that are
ef￿cient and individually rational cannot be achieved because they are not in the core. The
requirement that an equilibrium limit pro￿le be in the undercore means that the ultimate con-
tributions of the players in an equilibrium cannot be too unbalanced ￿ the total contribution of
any coalition is bounded.
Third, as the period length shrinks to zero, the set of equilibrium limit pro￿les converges to
the same set regardless of the move structure of the game. The only assumption made about the
move structure is that it satis￿es a weak cyclicity property, one that both the simultaneous-move
and the round-robin move structures satisfy. Hence, in this limiting sense, whether the players
can move simultaneously is irrelevant.
Fourth, as the period length shrinks, any undercore pro￿le can be achieved in a negligible
amount of real time. In other words, given any neighborhood of any undercore pro￿le, there
exists an equilibrium path that permanently enters the neighborhood in an amount of time that
goes to zero with the period length. Any equilibrium limit pro￿le can thus be achieved without
signi￿cant delay or real-time gradualism if the period length is small enough.
These properties of the set of equilibrium limit pro￿les carry over to the set of equilibrium
payoffs. The payoff generated by any undercore (and hence core) pro￿le is the limit of equilib-
rium payoffs as the period length vanishes. On the other hand, any ef￿cient payoff that is not a
core payoff is not the limit of equilibrium payoffs. Therefore, in contrast to repeated game folk
theorems, in general not all feasible individually rational payoffs can be achieved.3
3The games herein are stochastic games, with the state equal to the stage game action pro￿le. The folk theorem
of Dutta (1995) does not apply, however, because its ￿asymptotic state independence￿ assumptions (A1) and (A2)
are not satis￿ed.
21.1. Relationship to the Literature
The term ￿monotone game￿ is due to Gale (2001). He studies a broad class of them, in a
no-discounting setting in which each player’s payoff from an equilibrium path is equal to the
utility of its limiting pro￿le. (Assumptions are made so that all equilibrium paths converge.)
As in this paper, payoffs are assumed to satisfy a positive spillovers property: an increase in
one player’s action bene￿ts all the others. The key result is that any ￿strongly minimal positive
satiation point￿ is an equilibrium limit pro￿le. In the terms of this paper, a strongly minimal
pro￿le is one that is not weakly underblocked. It is a satiation point if, starting from it, no
player would want to unilaterally increase her contribution ￿ in this paper, by assumption, all
pro￿les are satiation points. The suf￿ciency result of this paper, that any strict undercore pro￿le
is an equilibrium limit pro￿le if the discount factor is high enough, is thus a partial extension
of Gale’s result to a particular class of games with discounting. The necessity result of this
paper, that any equilibrium limit pro￿le is in the strict undercore, is not shown in Gale (2001),
although it does hold in many no-discounting games (fn.8 below).
The literature on monotone games with discounting has focused on showing that dynamics
can alleviate the coordination/free-rider problem that plagues the corresponding static games.
For example, the no-contribution pro￿le is the only equilibrium of the static version of some of
the contribution games studied in Marx and Matthews (2000). Nonetheless, the corresponding
dynamicgameshaveequilibriainwhichtheplayerscontributeovertime, andthelimitingpro￿le
is either ef￿cient or approximately ef￿cient if the discount factor is low. In these equilibria a
player is induced to bear the cost of contributing by the implicit promise that the others will then
contribute in the future. Contributions each period must often be small, and the convergence
may take many periods or even be asymptotic. This gradualism is required when a large current
contribution by one player would increase the incentives of the others to free ride in the future
by too much.4
The literature on monotone games with discounting has obtained full characterizations of
equilibria only for games that have a threshold provision point, which is a contribution level that
any player will want to unilaterally achieve, as a dominant strategy, once the total contribution
is suf￿ciently large. This is the case, e.g., in games studied in Bagnoli and Lipman (1989),
Admati and Perry (1991), Gale (1995), Compte and Jehiel (2003), and Choi, Gale, and Kariv
4Strategic gradualism in related models is the focus of Lockwood and Thomas (2002), Compte and Jehiel (2004),
and Lockwood and Zissimos (2005).
3(2006). The threshold property implies, by backwards induction, that relatively few equilibria
exist, and the set of equilibrium limit pro￿les is much smaller than the undercore. In contrast,
the games of this paper do not have the threshold property, and backwards induction cannot be
used to characterize their equilibria.
Monotone games with discounting that lack the threshold property are studied in Marx and
Matthews (2000), Lockwood and Thomas (2002), and Pitchford and Snyder (2004). The basic
result is that approximately ef￿cient equilibria exist if discounting is close to zero. None of
of these papers attempts to characterize all equilibria. The latter two restrict attention to the
most ef￿cient equilibria. They also consider only two-person games, in which case the set of
undercore payoffs and the set of feasible individually rational payoffs are the same. Lockwood
and Thomas (2002) obtain two results that are generalized in this paper. First, they show that if
payoffs are differentiable, then the limit of the most ef￿cient symmetric equilibrium path is an
inef￿cientpro￿le. Thisresultisextendedtoabroaderclassofgamesandequilibriainthispaper.
Second, for the case of ￿linear kinked payoffs￿ they show that the most ef￿cient symmetric
equilibrium payoff of the simultaneous move game can be attained also in the sequential move
game, in the limit as discounting is taken to zero. This foreshadows the result of this paper that
any core payoff is the limit of equilibrium payoffs, regardless of the move structure.
1.2. Organization
The class of monotone contribution games studied in this paper is presented in Section 2; Ap-
pendix A shows how such a game arises as a model of a fund drive. The underlying coalitional
game, i.e., the de￿nitions and characterizations of the undercore and core, are presented in
Section 3, and Appendix B contains its longer proofs. The results characterizing the set of equi-
librium limit pro￿les are in Section 4, with the longer proofs in Appendix C. Implications are
drawn in Section 5. Section 6 contains a concluding comment on extensions.
2. Monotone Contribution Games
The set of players is N D f1;:::;ng; and they interact over periods t D 1;2;:::: In period t
player i chooses xt
i 2 RC; which is referred to variously as her action or her contribution. A





4The order of moves is speci￿ed by a move structure, which is a sequence E N D fNtg1
tD1 of




for i = 2 Nt:
An (action) pro￿le is denoted x D .x1;:::;xn/: A feasible path is a sequence E x D fxtg1
tD0 of
pro￿les which starts with x0 D 0; and is both monotone and consistent with the move structure:
for all t ￿ 1; 5
xt ￿ xt￿1; and xt
i D x
t￿1
i for i = 2 Nt:
A path E x gives player i the payoff




where u : Rn
C ! Rn is the stage game payoff function and ￿ 2 .0;1/ is the players’ common
discount factor.
Past actions are assumed to be publicly observed (but see Remark 2 below). This completes
the description of a monotone game to be denoted as 0.￿; E N/: Its pure strategy subgame perfect
equilibria are henceforth referred to simply as ￿equilibria￿. Of central interest are the limits of
equilibrium paths, the equilibrium limit pro￿les. The move structure and the payoff assumptions
are the following.
2.1. Move Structure
Because of the discounting, future rewards to a player will matter only if they are not received
too far in the future. Accordingly, the interval between the times at which a player can move
should not grow too quickly as the game progresses. To ensure this, the move structure is
assumed to satisfy the following ￿cyclicity￿ property:
(CY) m > 0 exists such that i 2 N.nkCi/m for all i 2 N and k ￿ 0:
This property requires player 1 to be able to move at date m; player 2 at date 2m; and so on
until the pattern repeats with player 1 able to move at date .n C 1/m: There are no restrictions
on who else can move at the dates that are multiples of m; nor on who can move at the other
dates. Both the simultaneous move structure de￿ned by Nt ￿ N; and the round-robin structure
5The convention here regarding vector inequalities is the following: x ￿ x0 means xi ￿ x0
i for all iI x > x0
means x 6D x0 and x ￿ x0I and x ￿ x0 means xi > x0
i for all i:
5de￿ned by N R
t ￿ ft modng; satisfy (CY) with m D 1: It will be clear that (CY) is stronger than
required, but it is simple and satis￿ed by many move structures.
2.2. Payoffs
Payoffs take the following form: for all x 2 Rn
C and i 2 N;
ui.x/ D vi.X/ ￿ xi;
where X D
P
i2N xi: This allows xi to be interpreted as the amount of private good that player
i contributes to a project that uses the total of the contributions, X; to produce a public good
that gives a bene￿t vj.X/ to each player j: A dynamic scenario behind this interpretation is
presented in Appendix A.
Each vi is continuous, normalized by vi.0/ D 0; and increasing. An increase in one player’s
action therefore bene￿ts all the others, so that the ￿positive spillovers￿ property holds:
(PS) ui.￿/ increases in x j for all i 6D j 2 N:
Each vi is also assumed to be strictly concave, continuously differentiable, and to satisfy
v0
i.0/ ￿ 1: This ensures that a ￿prisoners’ dilemma￿ property holds:
(PD) ui.￿/ decreases in xi for all i 2 N:
Hence, in any stage game, a player’s dominant strategy is to not raise her action above its
previous level. A player will raise her action in a period only if doing so is rewarded in the
future by other players raising their actions. Consequently, in no equilibrium is there a ￿nal
period in which actions are raised, and backwards induction cannot be used to ￿nd equilibria.












i2N vi.X/￿ X; the sum of the players’ payoffs when they contribute a total
amount X; has a unique and positive maximizer.
3. The Coalitional Game
Underlying the dynamic game is a coalitional game de￿ned by u: In this section its core, un-
dercore, and strict undercore are de￿ned and characterized, as a prerequisite to characterizing
equilibrium limit pro￿les in the next section.
63.1. Core and Undercore
De￿ne a coalition to be any nonempty subset of players. A coalition S is said to block a pro￿le
x using a pro￿le z if z￿S D 0; and ui.z/ > ui.x/ for all i 2 S: The core, C; is the set of pro￿les
that are not blocked. Any core pro￿le is ef￿cient (Pareto optimal), or else N would block it.6 It
is also individually rational, or else a singleton coalition would block it using the origin.
Blockingperseisnotrelevantforunderstandingtheequilibriumlimitpro￿lesofamonotone
game. Roughly speaking, it does not matter if a coalition prefers a pro￿le z to a putative limit
pro￿le x if z ￿ x: The coalition members for whom zi > xi would need to somehow coordinate
upward deviations to obtain z: However, coordination is not required if z < x; as then each
coalition member has an individual incentive to deviate downwards, or rather, to not raise her
action once it reaches zi: Blocking by a lower pro￿le is thus the relevant concept.
Refer to a pro￿le x as underblocked if a coalition blocks it using a pro￿le z < x: The
undercore, D; is then the set of pro￿les that are not underblocked. Note that the undercore
contains the core, since an underblocked pro￿le is blocked. An undercore pro￿le is individually
rational, or else it would be underblocked by a singleton coalition using the origin. The origin
is itself in the undercore ￿ it is not underblocked because no pro￿le is below it.
The payoff assumptions of this paper imply a useful depiction of the undercore. For any





as the surplus function of S: It is the sum of the coalition members’ payoffs when their total
contribution is X; and the non-coalition players contribute nothing. Since fS is strictly concave,
(2) implies it has a unique maximizer ￿ denote it as YS: De￿ne the value of the coalition to be
its maximal surplus, V.S/ ￿ fS.YS/:
Remark 1. This V deﬁnes a coalitional game with transferable utility. The actual coalitional
game here has nontransferable utility, due to the constraint x ￿ 0: (For example, x is efﬁcient
in the transferable utility game if and only if X D YN; but here it is also efﬁcient if X > YN and
xi D 0 for some i 2 N:/ The two games have the same core, as is shown below.
6A small argument is needed to prove that inef￿cient pro￿les are not in the core. If x is inef￿cient, z exists
such that u.z/ > u.x/: Choose i such that ui.z/ > ui.x/: By (PS), raising zi slightly yields a pro￿le O z satisfying
u.O z/ ￿ u.x/: So x is blocked by N using O z; which proves that x is not in the core.
7A pro￿le is underblocked if and only it requires some coalition to make too large a con-
tribution. For any coalition S and pro￿le x; let XS denote the coalition’s total contribution:
XS ￿
P
i2S xi: The proof of the following lemma is in Appendix B (as are all the proofs miss-
ing from this section).









Conversely, if (3) holds then x is underblocked by a coalition O S ￿ S:
It is easy to see why (3) holds if S underblocks x: Half of it comes from the fact that S blocks
x; and so the sum of the coalition members’ payoffs must be less than what they can achieve
on their own:
P
i2S vi.X/ ￿ XS < V.S/: The other half, XS > YS; follows from the fact that
the blocking pro￿le satis￿es z < x: Why (3) implies x is underblocked is less straightforward.
The underblocking coalition is not S itself if xi is very small for some of its members, as then
they cannot be made better off by any nonnegative z < x: The coalition that underblocks x is
obtained by deleting these members.
Lemma 1 immediately yields a characterization of the undercore.








for all coalitions S: (4)
Given a pro￿le x; the corresponding coalition of contributing players is
N.x/ ￿ fi 2 N jxi > 0g:
The following corollary shows that if x is an undercore pro￿le, then the total contribution it
prescribes is no greater than that which maximizes the surplus of this coalition.
Corollary 1. Any nonzero x 2 D satisﬁes X ￿ YN.x/:
Proof. Let S D N.x/: Since X D XS, (4) would imply V.S/ ￿ fS.X/ if X > YS. This is
impossible, since fS is uniquely maximized by YS:
The next corollary relates the core to the undercore, and shows that the core is the same as
that of the related transferable utility game (see Remark 1).
8Corollary 2. C D Ca D Cb; where
(a) Ca ￿ fx 2 D j X D YNg; and
(b) Cb ￿ fx 2 Rn
C j X D YN; and XS ￿
P
i2S vi.YN/ ￿ V.S/ 8 coalitions Sg:
Corollaries 1 and 2 together show that the core is equal to the intersection of the northeast
surface of the undercore with the simplex de￿ned by X D YN:
Turning to payoffs, the set of individually rational feasible payoffs is
R ￿ fO u 2 u.Rn
C/j O u ￿ 0g:
(Recall that u.0/ D 0:/ The set of ef￿cient individually rational payoffs is
P ￿
￿
O u 2 R j O u ￿ u0 for any u0 2 R
￿
:
Clearly, u.D/ ￿ R and u.C/ ￿ P: Since a pro￿le with X ￿ YN is ef￿cient if and only if
X D YN; Corollary 2 .a/ implies that
u.C/ D P \ u.D/: (5)
Typically, a coalition S 6D N exists such that v.S/ > 0:7 The next corollary shows that
then some individually rational feasible payoffs are not undercore payoffs, and some ef￿cient
individually rational payoffs are not core payoffs.
Corollary 3. u.D/ is a proper subset of R; and u.C/ is a proper subset of P; if and only if
V.S/ > 0 for some coalition S 6D N:
3.2. Strict Undercore
A subset of the undercore plays a central role. It’s de￿nition relies on extending the underblock-
ing relation by using of weak preferences. Say a coalition S weakly underblocks a pro￿le x if
z < x exists such that z￿S D 0; and ui.z/ ￿ ui.x/ for all i 2 S: Thus, an underblocked pro￿le
is weakly underblocked, but not conversely. The strict undercore is de￿ned by
Ds ￿ f0g [
￿
x 2 Rn
Cnf0gj X < YN.x/ and x is not weakly underblocked
￿
:
7This is not true, however, if n D 2; since we have V.fig/ D 0 for each i 2 N:
9The strict undercore thus consists of the origin together with all nonzero pro￿les that are not
weakly underblocked, and are inef￿cient for the coalitions they require to contribute. The un-
dercore contains the strict undercore.
Lemma 2 below establishes three properties of the strict undercore. First, it is nonempty
because it contains the line segment from the origin to the Lindahl pro￿le de￿ned by xL
i ￿
v0
i.YN/YN: Second, deleting the origin from it yields a relatively open set. Third, its closure is
the undercore ￿ the difference between the undercore and the strict undercore is negligible.
Lemma 2. .i/ For every O X 2 [0;YN/; Ds contains the proﬁle deﬁned by xi ￿ v0
i.YN/ O X:
.ii/ Dsnf0g is relatively open in Rn
C: .iii/ cl Ds D D:
4. Equilibrium Limit Pro￿les
Recall that an equilibrium limit pro￿le is the limit of an equilibrium path. (Equilibrium paths
will be shown to converge.) Let E.￿; E N/ be the set of equilibrium limit pro￿les of 0.￿; E N/: The
set of all pro￿les that are equilibrium limit pro￿les for some discount factor is then
E. E N/ ￿ [
￿2.0;1/
E.￿; E N/:
The main result of this section is that this set is equal to the strict undercore.
4.1. Preliminaries
Given any history, de￿ne a player’s passive strategy in the continuation game to be the one
requiring her to not raise her action at any node. Because of (PS), the worst conceivable punish-
ment the other players can impose upon a unilateral deviator is to play their passive strategies
thereafter. Because of (PD), the passive strategy pro￿le is an equilibrium of any continuation
game. Consequently, any feasible path is an equilibrium path if and only if it is supported by
the passive strategies. That is, if E x is an equilibrium path, then the strategy pro￿le that requires
xt to be played in period t if .x1;:::;xt￿1/ was played in the past, but otherwise requires the
previous period’s pro￿le to be played, is an equilibrium.
Remark 2. This argument does not need perfect monitoring. Suppose instead that the players
publicly observe only the aggregates, Xt D
P
i2N xt
i: Any unilateral deviation from a pure
strategy proﬁle is then still publicly observed. Any sequential equilibrium path is hence the
10path of a perfect public equilibrium in which any unilateral deviation is punished by playing the
passive strategies.
By (PD), a player’s best deviation in period t; given that it triggers the passive equilibrium,
is to play x
t￿1












This deviation payoff cannot exceed the player’s equilibrium continuation payoff. Hence, the




￿i/ ￿ .1 ￿ ￿/
P
s￿t
￿s￿tui.xs/ for all t ￿ 1;i 2 Nt: (6)
The following lemma records these observations. In addition, it shows that the inequality in (6)
also holds for players i = 2 Nt: (The rest of its proof is in Appendix C.)
Lemma 3. Let E x be feasible for E N: Then condition (6) is necessary and sufﬁcient for E x to be




￿i/ ￿ .1 ￿ ￿/
P
s￿t
￿s￿tui.xs/ for all t ￿ 1;i 2 N: (7)
A consequence of Lemma 3 is that any E x that leaves the origin and converges in a ￿nite
number of periods is not an equilibrium path. To see why, let T be the date at which the path














less, no payoff in the sequence is greater than its limit.
Lemma 4. If E x is an equilibrium path with limit x; then u.xt/ ￿ u.x/ for all t ￿ 1:
Note that Lemma 4 immediately implies that for any equilibrium path E x converging to a
pro￿le x; the corresponding equilibrium payoff satis￿es U.E x;￿/ ￿ u.x/:
114.2. Necessity
Any equilibrium limit pro￿le is now shown to be in the strict undercore.
Theorem 1. Everyequilibriumlimitproﬁle x is.i/notweaklyunderblocked,8 and.ii/satisﬁes
x D 0 or X < YN.x/: That is, E. E N/ ￿ Ds:
Theproofof.i/(inAppendixC)proceedsbyshowingthatifacoalitionweaklyunderblocks
an equilibrium limit pro￿le using a pro￿le z; then the coalition member who is supposed to be
the last to raise her action above zi can do better by not doing so. The logic of the argument is
shown here by using it to prove the convergence of equilibrium paths.
Proof that equilibrium paths converge. Let E x be a nonconvergent feasible path. It is thus
unbounded. This implies ui.xt/ ! ￿1 for some i 2 N.9 This player underblocks, using the
origin, each pro￿le in the tail of the path: ￿ ￿ 1 exists such that ui.x￿￿1/ > ui.xs/ for all s ￿ ￿:
This prevents E x from being an equilibrium path. For, if player i deviates at date ￿ by staying at
x
￿￿1
i ; her continuation payoff will be at least ui.x
￿￿1
i ;x￿
￿i/; which weakly exceeds ui.x￿￿1/ by








Lemma 3 therefore implies that E x is not an equilibrium path. ￿
The remainder of Theorem 1 follows directly from the following result.













To see that Lemma 5 proves part .ii/ of Theorem 1, note that the right side of (8) is positive
because X > 0: The left side is therefore positive, and this implies X < YN.x/ by concavity.10
8Theorem 1 .i/ holds for any u satisfying (PD) and (PS). Its proof does not use the assumed quasilinearity,
concavity, or perfect substitutability of the players’ contributions. It also holds (and is proved more simply) if there
is no discounting, i.e., if limt!1 u.xt/ is the payoff from a path E x:
9Recall that fN.X/ is strictly concave and maximized at YN < 1: This implies fN.Xt/ ! ￿1 as Xt ! 1:
Since fN.X/ D
P
i2N ui.x/; we thus have ui.xt/ ! ￿1 for some i 2 N:
10Lemma 5 also implies that for any coalition S; a nonzero equilibrium limit pro￿le exists in which S is the
coalition of contributing players only if ￿ ￿ A=.A C B/; where A D 1 ￿ maxi2S v0




12The following is a heuristic argument for why (8) must hold. To a ￿rst-order approximation,
the equilibrium contribution Ct D Xt ￿ Xt￿1 made at date t increases the present value of the




















i /:So MB mustexceed
the sum, over the contributing players, of these net costs. The lowest this total net cost can be is
its value if the entire contribution were to be made by the player who has the smallest net cost











Inequality (8) is obtained by setting MB ￿ MC; deleting the factor Ct; and taking t ! 1.
Remark 3. Equilibrium limit proﬁles may be efﬁcient if payoff functions are not differentiable.
Suppose each player’s marginal valuation v0
i is positive until it drops to zero at an amount
X￿ that “completes” the project. If X￿ is the efﬁcient total contribution and ￿ is sufﬁciently
large, equilibrium paths may exist for which Xt ! X￿: See Marx and Matthews (2000) and
Lockwood and Thomas (2002).
4.3. Suf￿ciency
Any strict undercore pro￿le is now shown to be an equilibrium limit pro￿le, provided the dis-
count factor is high enough.
Theorem 2. For any x 2 Ds; there exists a path E x converging to x; and a discount factor ￿ < 1;
such that E x is an equilibrium path if ￿ > ￿:
Theorem 2 relies on the following lemma. Recall that the round-robin move structure is
de￿ned by N R
t ￿ ft modng:
Lemma 6. For any ￿ 2 .0;1/; E.￿; E N R/ ￿ E.￿1=m; E N/: Hence, E. E N R/ ￿ E. E N/:
This is proved by replacing N.x/ in (8) by S; and lowering X to 0: The inequality is maintained because the left
(right) side of (8) decreases (increases) with X:
13Lemma 6 is proved by converting an equilibrium path of 0.￿; E N R/ into a path that is feasible
for E N: This is where assumption (CY) is used. The new path is obtained by slowing down the
round-robin path: player 1 moves in period m instead of period 1; player 2 moves in period
2m instead of period 2; and so on. This results in a postponement of the future reward a player
receives for raising her contribution in the current period, but raising the discount factor to ￿1=m
increases its present value enough to restore incentives.
Consequently, Theorem 2 needs to be proved only for the round-robin structure. The logic
of its proof (in Appendix C) is described here, under the simplifying assumption that the strict
undercore pro￿le is strictly positive: x ￿ 0:








Then two pro￿les are found, O x D x ￿ O ￿d and N x D x ￿ N ￿d; where 0 < O ￿ < N ￿: The number
N ￿ is chosen so that N x ￿ 0: The number O ￿ is chosen small enough that O x 2 DsI this can be
done by Lemma 2 .ii/; since x 2 Dsnf0g: These constructed pro￿les satisfy N x ￿ O x ￿ x and
u.N x/ ￿ u.O x/ ￿ u.x/: The proof is completed in three steps.
In Step 1, a round-robin path starting at N x and converging to x is found that is an equilibrium
path of the subgame starting at N x; provided ￿ exceeds some ￿0 < 1: For each player this path
is a geometric sequence with periodic gaps. The amount by which a contribution is raised in
any period is small enough that the other players’ payoffs are bounded below the target payoff,
u.x/: This bound shrinks to zero as t ! 1; but slowly enough that for all suf￿ciently high
discount factors and all dates t; a player’s continuation utility on the path is close enough to
ui.x/ that she is induced to raise her contribution in the current period. This step makes use of
X < YN and the concavity of each vi:
Step 2, on the other hand, uses the fact that x; or rather, O x; is not weakly underblocked.
Adapting an argument in Gale (2001), a ￿nite, decreasing round-robin path from N x to the origin
is constructed, along which the players’ payoffs never exceed u.O x/: The construction starts
with player 1 lowering her contribution from N x1 either all the way to 0; or to a point at which
the resulting pro￿le gives her the same payoff as would O x: This yields the ￿rst pro￿le of the
sequence. The second pro￿le is obtained next by having player 2 lower her contribution in the
same manner. Continuing in round-robin fashion yields a decreasing sequence of pro￿les that
generatepayoffsnogreaterthanu.O x/:Thesequenceconverges, saytoapro￿le z:Because O x isin
14the strict undercore, z D 0 : otherwise, the coalition N.z/ would be nonempty, and its members
would be indifferent between z and O x; thereby weakly underblocking O x: Since u.0/ ￿ u.O x/
(as O x is not weakly underblocked by a singleton coalition), the convergence occurs in a ￿nite
number of steps: once the sequence is close enough to the origin, a player’s contribution cannot
be lowered enough to make her indifferent between the resulting pro￿le and O x:
Step 3 puts together the paths obtained in Steps 1 and 2 to yield a path E z that converges to
x and is feasible for E N R: At any date for which zt ￿ N x; Step 1 insures that the remainder of the
path is an equilibrium path of the continuation game if ￿ > ￿0: At any date t for which zt < N x;
u.zt/ is bounded strictly below u.x/; since u.zt/ ￿ u.O x/ ￿ u.x/ by Step 2: This implies that
(7) holds for all ￿ greater than some ￿t < 1: Hence, E z is an equilibrium path of 0.￿; E N R/ for all
￿ greater than ￿0 and each of the ￿nite number of ￿t’s.
5. Implications
Theorems 1 and 2 together show that the set of equilibrium limit pro￿les expands with ￿ and
converges to the strict undercore:
Theorem 3. E.￿; E N/ ￿ E.￿0; E N/ for all ￿ < ￿0; and
E. E N/ D lim
￿!1
E.￿; E N/ D Ds:
The set of equilibrium limit pro￿les is observationally indistinguishable from its closure.
By Lemma 2, taking closures in Theorem 3 shows that the closure of the set of equilibrium
limit pro￿les is the undercore:
cl E. E N/ D D: (9)
This has implications for the necessity of gradualism, the nature of equilibrium payoffs, and the
role of the move structure.
5.1. Gradualism
Since an equilibrium path converging to a nonzero pro￿le does so only asymptotically, equilib-
rium contributions must be raised gradually. This accords with gradualism results in, e.g., Marx
and Matthews (2000), Lockwood and Thomas (2002), and Compte and Jehiel (2004).
Real-time gradualism, however, is not necessary if the period length is short. To see why,
let 1 be the period length, and set ￿ D e￿r1: By Theorems 2 and 3, for any equilibrium limit
15pro￿le x; a ￿xed path E x converging to it exists that is an equilibrium path if 1 is small. Given a
neighborhood of x; let T be the ￿nite number of periods it takes for E x to permanently enter the
neighborhood. The amount of time the path takes to reach the neighborhood is then T1; which
goes to zero as 1 ! 0: Every equilibrium limit pro￿le, or rather, undercore pro￿le, can thus be
reached instantaneously in the limit as the period length goes to zero.
5.2. Equilibrium Payoffs
Let W.￿; E N/ ￿ Rn denote the set of equilibrium payoffs of 0.￿; E N/: The set of limits of
equilibrium payoffs is then







The payoff generated by an equilibrium path E x is a weighted average of the stage game
payoffs u.xt/; and hence not determined solely by the corresponding equilibrium limit pro￿le
x: However, raising ￿ shifts weight to the tail of the path, and so U.E x;￿/ ! u.x/ as ￿ ! 1:
Theorems 2 and 3 therefore imply that the payoff generated by any undercore pro￿le is the limit
of equilibrium payoffs:
u.D/ ￿ W. E N/: (10)
Since C ￿ D; an implication of (10) is that core payoffs are limits of equilibrium payoffs.
The core payoffs are the only ef￿cient payoffs for which this is true:
Corollary 4. If a limit of equilibrium payoffs is efﬁcient, it is a core payoff.
Proof. Theorem 1 and Lemma 4 imply that any payoff in W.￿; E N/ is weakly dominated by
a strict undercore payoff. Thus, letting O u 2 W. E N/; there exists x 2 D such that O u ￿ u.x/:
Assuming O u is ef￿cient, this implies O u D u.x/: Hence, O u 2 u.D/: Recalling from (5) that any
ef￿cient undercore payoff is a core payoff, we now have O u 2 u.C/:
Corollary 4, together with (5) and (10), implies that the set of ef￿cient payoffs that are limits
of equilibrium payoffs is equal to the set of core payoffs:
P \ W. E N/ D u.C/: (11)
Recall from Corollary 3 that if V.S/ > 0 for some S 6D N; then not all ef￿cient individually
rational payoffs are core payoffs. In this case ef￿cient individually rational payoffs exist that
are not limits of equilibrium payoffs: PnW. E N/ 6D ?:
165.3. Move Structure Relevance
A consequence of Theorem 3 is that all move structures give rise to the same equilibrium limit
pro￿les: E. E N/ does not depend on E N: In this sense the move structure is irrelevant. Note, how-
ever, that the lowest discount factor for which a given strict undercore pro￿le is an equilibrium
limit pro￿le may depend on E N: The round-robin structure typically requires a higher discount
factor than does the simultaneous structure to achieve a given pro￿le.
Turning to payoffs, (11) shows that the set of ef￿cient payoffs in in the limiting equilibrium
payoff set W. E N/ is also independent of E N: Any ef￿ciency advantage that the simultaneous
structure has over the round-robin structure disappears in the limit as the period length decreases
to zero.
By (10), W. E N/ contains the (large) set u.D/ of undercore payoffs, which does not depend
on E N: Whether the remainder, W. E N/nu.D/; is also independent of E N is left for future work to
determine.11
6. Concluding Comment
A topic for the future is the extent to which the results hold for more general payoffs. For ex-
ample, consider the polar opposite of this paper’s valuation functions, the discrete one de￿ned,





0 for X < X￿
Vi for X ￿ X￿:
A path E x then generates a payoff of

















where T.E x/ is the ￿rst date at which Xt ￿ X￿; if such a date exists, and othewise T.E x/ D 1:
The interpretation is that player i contributes a private good amount xt
i ￿ x
t￿1
i in period t;
bearing the cost immediately, and the project generates the bene￿ts Vi once the total cumulative
contribution Xt reaches X￿ (see Appendix A).
Compte and Jehiel (2003) study this game, assuming there are two players; the move struc-
ture is alternating, with player 1 moving ￿rst; the values differ, V2 < V1I free riding is an
11A conjecture is that W. E N/nu.D/ D ? for all E N:
17issue, Vi < X￿I and ef￿ciency requires completion, V1 C V2 > X￿: Their result is that for any
￿ 2 .￿;1/; where ￿ D .K ￿V1/=V2; the equilibrium path is unique: x1 D 0; x2 D .0; X￿￿V1/;
and xt D .V1; X￿ ￿ V1/ for all t ￿ 3:
The equilibrium limit pro￿le, .V1; X￿ ￿ V1/; is not in the strict undercore, as it is both
ef￿cient and weakly underblocked (by player 1). But it is in the core and undercore, and so the
necessity result of Theorem 1 fails in a relatively minor way. Theorem 2, on the other hand,
fails more strikingly. The pro￿les that are not weakly underblocked consist of the origin, which
is the only strict undercore pro￿le, and the continuum of pro￿les for which x1 C x2 D X￿ and
xi < Vi. None of these are equilibrium limit pro￿les.
This example exhibits the threshold property discussed in the introduction. It may thus be
true that results like those of this paper hold whenever the threshold property is absent.
18Appendix A. Fund Drive Scenarios
The monotonicity restriction, and the time-separable payoff function shown in (1), are taken in
the text as de￿ning features of the games of interest. However, they arise from natural primitive
assumptions in some scenarios. Such a scenario is described in this appendix, amplifying on
the model of a fund drive in Marx and Matthews (2000).
As noted in the introduction, fund drives, or rather, never-ending sequences of fund drives,
are used to ￿nance many public goods, like new university buildings or public television shows.
The contributions collected in these drives become the capital used to produce future bene￿ts.
Participants can contribute any number of times, and are often informed of the total amounts
contributed to date. These features are consistent with a monotone contribution game (see
Remark2). However, modelingafunddriveasamonotonecontributiongamerequiresplausible
assumptions to be made that yield monotonicity and a time-separable payoff function.
The key to obtaining monotonicity is to let xt
i denote the cumulative contribution that player
i has made by date t: Thus, xt
i ￿x
t￿1




i ; is now the result of assuming contributions must be nonnegative.
Two assumptions imply that fund drive payoffs can be written as in (1). The ￿rst is that a
player’s utility in a period is quasilinear in her incremental contribution that period. The second
is that the capital used by the project to produce public goods does not decay, so that the capital
available in period t to produce public goods is Xt; the total of all contributions made to date.
Given these assumptions, let bi.Xt/ denote the rate at which player i bene￿ts from public good
￿ow in period t: Let her discount rate be r; and the period length be 1: Her payoff from a























where ￿ D e￿r1: This payoff is not written as a time-separable sum. However, its linearity in
the xt
i terms allows it to be rewritten:12

















19Setting vi.X/ D r￿1bi.X/ and ui.x/ D vi.X/ ￿ xi; this payoff is as shown in (1).
Observe that this vi.X/ depends on the discount rate r. Taking ￿ ! 1 corresponds to
1 ! 0; holdingr ￿xed. Thus, if the motivation for studying the monotone game is a fund drive
scenario as described here, it is important to interpret ￿ ! 1 as the period length shrinking, not
the discount rate. Taking r ! 0 would be of little interest: it would cause r￿1bi.X/ ! 1;
so that the discounted present value of public good bene￿ts would overwhelm the bounded (by
YN/ cost of contributing. The motivating free-rider problem would trivially vanish.
As a ￿nal observation, note that the transformation of (12) into (13) requires quasilinearity.
For example, consider the assumption of Admati and Perry (1991) that a player’s cost of making
a contribution is wi.xt
i ￿ x
t￿1











cannot be written as a time-separable sum, and so a monotone game is not obtained. This is
clear economically. In a monotone game, a (non-equilibrium) path in which the players leap
immediately to an ef￿cient pro￿le in the ￿rst period and stay there forever is ef￿cient. But in a
fund drive with strictly convex cost functions wi; dynamic ef￿ciency requires contributions to
be made incrementally.
Appendix B. Proofs of Undercore and Core Results
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose S underblocks x: Since f .XS/ D
P
i2S




vi.X/ ￿ XS: (14)
Let z < x be the pro￿le S uses to underblock x: Then z￿S D 0 and, for all i 2 N; vi.X/￿ xi <
vi.Z/ ￿ zi: Summing these inequalities yields
P
i2S
vi.X/ ￿ XS < f .Z/ ￿ V.S/: (15)
Hence, XS >
P
i2S vi.X/ ￿ V.S/: From (14) and (15) we obtain f .XS/ < f .Z/: This and


















De￿ne z 2 Rn by z￿S D 0 and, for i 2 S;
zi ￿ xi ￿ 1 ￿ vi.X/ C vi.YS/:
Then zi < xi for all i 2 S: Summing zi over S yields Z D YS: Hence,
O S ￿ fi 2 S jzi ￿ 0g 6D ?:
De￿ne O z 2 Rn
C by O zi ￿ max.0;zi/: Then O z￿O S D 0 and O z < x: Because O Z ￿ Z D YS; for each
i 2 O S we have
vi. O Z/ ￿ zi ￿ vi.YS/ ￿ zi D vi.X/ ￿ xi C 1:
Since 1 > 0; this proves that O S underblocks x: ￿
Proof of Corollary 2. We prove C ￿ Ca ￿ Cb ￿ C; in this order.
We know C ￿ D; and hence x 2 C only if X ￿ YN; by Corollary 1. We also know core
pro￿les are ef￿cient. A pro￿le for which X ￿ YN is ef￿cient only if X D YN: Thus, C ￿ Ca:












Thus, since X D YN; Proposition 1 implies XS ￿
P
i2S vi.YN/ ￿ V.S/: This proves Ca ￿ Cb:
Now let x 2 Cb; and let z be any pro￿le satisfying z￿S D 0 for some coalition S: Note that
P








This proves that x is unblocked, and hence Cb ￿ C: ￿
Proof of Corollary 3 .)/: We prove this direction by assuming V.S/ D 0 for all coalitions
S 6D N; and showing that then R ￿ u.D/: This suf￿ces, since it implies R D u.D/; and so
P D P \ u.D/ D u.C/:
21Let O u 2 R and w ￿
P
i2N O ui: Then w ￿ 0 D fN.0/: Since O u D u.O x/ for some O x 2 Rn
C;
w D fN.O x/ ￿ V.N/: The intermediate value theorem thus implies that fN.X/ D w for some
X 2 [0;YN]: De￿ne x 2 Rn by xi ￿ vi.X/ ￿ O ui: To complete the proof, we show that x 2 D:
This will prove O u 2 u.D/; and hence R ￿ u.D/:
We ￿rst show x 2 Rn
C: Let S D fi 2 N jxi ￿ 0g: Because X ￿ 0; S is not empty. Suppose










vi.X/ ￿ X ￿ V.S/:
By assumption, V.S/ D 0; and hence O ui < 0 for some i 2 S: This contradiction of O u 2 R
proves S D N; and so x 2 Rn
C:
For any S0 6D N we have
P











For S0 D N; we have XS0 ￿ YN D YS0: Proposition 1 now implies x 2 D: ￿
Proof of Corollary 3 .(/: We prove this direction assuming V.S/ > 0 for some S 6D N; and
showing that then u.C/ is a proper subset of P: This also proves u.D/ is a proper subset of R;
since u.D/ D R would imply the contradiction u.C/ D P \ u.D/ D P:
Since S 6D N; YS 6D YN: Thus
P
i2S vi.YN/ ￿ V.S/ < YN; since YS uniquely maximizes
fS: We can thus choose an amount XS for S to contribute such that
P
i2S








The second inequality implies that xS 2 R
jSj
C exists such that
P
i2S xi D XS and, for each i 2 S;
xi < vi.YN/: Observe that
P
i = 2S








> YN ￿ XS;
where the ￿rst inequality follows from V.N/ > V.S/, and the second follows from the ￿rst
inequality in (16). Thus, x￿S 2 R
jNnSj
C exists such that
P
i = 2S xi D YN ￿ XS; and xi < vi.YN/
22for each i = 2 S: We have thus found a pro￿le, x D .xS;x￿S/; that is individually rational and,
since X D YN; ef￿cient. This proves u.x/ 2 P: By the ￿rst inequality in (16), S blocks x; and
so x = 2 C: Since S also blocks any O x for which u.O x/ D u.x/; we have u.x/ = 2 u.C/: This proves
u.C/ is a proper subset of P: ￿
The following lemma, an analog to Proposition 1, characterizes the set of pro￿les that are
not weakly underblocked. It is used below to prove Lemma 2.
Lemma A1. Any x 2 Rn
C is not weakly underblocked if and only if, for all coalitions S;
X ￿ YS or XS <
P
i2S
vi.X/ ￿ V.S/: (17)
Proof. (The proof is like that of Lemma 1.) Suppose x is not weakly underblocked, but (17)
does not hold for a coalition S: Hence,








i2S vi.X/ C XS
￿
=jSj ￿ 0:De￿ne z 2 Rn by z￿S D 0
and, for i 2 S;
zi ￿ xi ￿ 1 ￿ vi.X/ C vi.YS/:
Then zi < xi for all i 2 S: Summing zi over S yields Z D YS ￿ 0: Hence,
O S ￿ fi 2 S jzi ￿ 0g 6D ?:
De￿ne O z 2 Rn
C by O zi ￿ max.0;zi/: Then O z￿O S D 0 and O z < x: Because O Z ￿ Z D YS; for each
i 2 O S we have
vi. O Z/ ￿ zi ￿ vi.YS/ ￿ zi D vi.X/ ￿ xi C 1:
Since 1 ￿ 0; we conclude that O S weakly underblocks x using O z: Therefore, if x is not weakly
underblocked, (17) holds for all coalitions S:
Now suppose x is weakly underblocked, say by a coalition S using z < x: Then z￿S D 0
and, for all i 2 N; vi.X/ ￿ xi ￿ vi.Z/ ￿ zi: Summing these inequalities yields
P
i2S
vi.X/ ￿ XS ￿ f .Z/: (18)




vi.X/ ￿ V.S/: (19)




i2S vi.Z/; and so
X ￿ Z; contrary to z < x: hence, Z < XS: Since f .XS/ ￿
P
i2S vi.X/ ￿ XS; (18) implies
f .XS/ ￿ f .Z/: This and Z < XS imply XS > YS; since fS is strictly concave and maximized
at YS: This and (19) show that (17) does not hold for S: Thus, x is not weakly underblocked if
(17) holds for all coalitions. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2 .i/. We have X D O X; since
P
i2N v0
i.YN/ D 1: Since N.x/ D N; we also
have X < YN.x/: Thus, by Lemma A1, we show x 2 Ds by showing that
P
i2S vi.X/ ￿ XS >





































￿ ￿x0 ￿ x
￿ ￿ < "
￿
; where " > 0 is
so small that all x0 2 B satisfy x0
i > 0 if xi > 0 for i 2 N; and for any S;






vi.X0/ ￿ V.S/ if XS 7
P
i2S
vi.X/ ￿ V.S/: (21)
Letting x0 2 B; we must prove x0 2 Dsnf0g: We have x0 6D 0; since x 6D 0: Since x 2 Dsnf0g;
we have X < YN.x/; and so (20) implies X0 < YN.x/: We also have N.x/ ￿ N.x0/; and so
YN.x/ ￿ YN.x0/: Thus, X0 < YN.x0/: It remains only to show that x0 is not weakly blocked.
Letting S be a coalition, we verify that X0 and S satisfy (17). They do if X0 ￿ YS; so suppose





vi.X0/ ￿ V.S/: (22)







24Since X0 > YS; (20) implies X ￿ YS: If X > YS; then (17) holding for X and S implies
XS <
P
i2S vi.X/ ￿ V.S/: This and (21) yield (22). On the other hand, if X D YS; then
S 6D N.x/ because X < YN.x/: Thus, XS < X; and so




From this and (21), we again obtain (22). ￿
Proof of Lemma 2 .iii/. Proposition 1 implies D is closed, and so cl Ds ￿ D: To show the
reverse, let x 2 D: Since x 2 Ds if x D 0; we can assume x 6D 0: Choose O X 2 .0; X/ such that
O X > YS for all coalitions S for which X > YS: Then de￿ne O x by O xi D v0
i.YN/ O X: By part .i/;
O x 2 Ds: De￿ne x￿ ￿ ￿x C .1 ￿ ￿/O x: Suppose X￿ > YS for some coalition S and ￿ 2 .0;1/:
This implies X > YS and O X > YS: Because X > YS;
P
i2S
vi.X/ ￿ V.S/ >
P
i2S
vi.YS/ ￿ V.S/ D YS:









vi. O X/ ￿ V.S/:
Thus, since X￿






Lemma A1 now implies x￿ is not weakly underblocked. We also have X￿ < YN.x￿/; since the
strict positivity of O x implies N.x￿/ D N; and X￿ < X ￿ YN.x/ ￿ YN: Therefore, x￿ 2 Ds:
Taking ￿ ! 1 proves x is a limit point of Ds: ￿
Appendix C. Proofs of Equilibrium Limit Pro￿le Results
This appendix contains the proofs of results in Section 4.
Proof of Lemma 3. Condition (6) was shown in the text to be necessary and suf￿cient for E x to
be an equilibrium path of 0.￿; E N/: Since (6) obviously holds if (7) does, we must now show the








We can assume i = 2 Nt; else (23) follows directly from (6). Let ￿ be the ￿rst date greater than t
such that i 2 N￿: Since E x is feasible for E N; we have xs
i D x
t￿1










































The ￿rst of these inequalities follows from (PS), xs
￿i ￿ xt
￿i; and (6) applied to date ￿I the
second follows from (PS) and x￿
￿i ￿ xt
￿i: This proves (23). ￿
Proof of Lemma 4. Let t ￿ 0: Since E x satis￿es (7), and ui.xt/ ￿ ui.xt
i;x
tC1
￿i / by (PS), we have




The right side of this inequality is a convex combination of fui.xs/gs>t: Hence, there exists
s > t such that ui.xt/ ￿ ui.xs/: Repeating the argument recursively yields a subsequence
fskg1
kD1 of dates such that sk ! 1 as k ! 1; and ui.xt/ ￿ ui.xsk/ ￿ ui.xskC1/: Since
fui.xsk/g converges to ui.x/; we conclude that u.xt/ ￿ ui.x/: ￿
Proof of Theorem 1 .i/: Let ￿ 2 .0;1/ and x 2 E.￿; E N/: Assume x is weakly underblocked.
Then a coalition S and pro￿le z < x exist such that z￿S D 0; and
ui.z/ ￿ ui.x/ for all i 2 S: (24)
If zi D xi for some i 2 S; then z < x would imply z￿i < x￿i; and so (PS) would yield
ui.z/ D ui.xi;z￿i/ < ui.x/. As this is impossible by (24), we have zS ￿ xS:
Let E x be an equilibrium path of 0.￿; E N/ that converges to x: De￿ne a set of dates,
T ￿ ft ￿ 1jxt
i ￿ zi for all i 2 Sg:
26Since zS ￿ xS; T 6D ?: Let ￿ be the smallest date in T . Then j 2 S exists such that
x
￿￿1
j < z j ￿ x￿
j: Since ￿ 2 T and z￿S D 0; z￿j ￿ x￿
￿j: Hence, by (PS),
u j.z j;x￿
￿j/ ￿ u j.z/: (25)
Because x
￿￿1




￿j/ > u j.z j;x￿
￿j/: (26)




￿j/ > u j.x/: (27)








￿ .1 ￿ ￿/
P
s￿￿
￿s￿￿u j.x/ D u j.x/:
This contradiction of (27) proves x is not weakly blocked. ￿
Proof of Lemma 5. Let E x be an equilibrium path of 0.￿; E N/ that converges to x: Fix i 2 N and
















Using the assumed form of ui; and letting Q Xt ￿ Xt ￿ xt
i C x
t￿1











Because vi is concave and differentiable,
v0
i. Q Xt/.Xs ￿ Q Xt/ ￿ vi.Xs/ ￿ vi. Q Xt/:
For s ￿ t; the left side of this inequality is not lowered by replacing v0
i. Q Xt/ by v0
i.Xt￿1/; since
Xt￿1 ￿ Q Xt and Xs ￿ Q Xt ￿ 0: Hence, for s ￿ t;
v0
i.Xt￿1/.Xs ￿ Q Xt/ ￿ vi.Xs/ ￿ vi. Q Xt/:


















































































i / ￿ 0:
Using the identity .1 ￿ ￿/
P
s￿t ￿s￿t.Xs ￿ Xt/ D ￿
P

















i / ￿ 0: (29)
Since X > 0; we have v0




i.X/ < b < 1:
Let T be a date such that b > v0
i.Xt￿1/ for any t ￿ T and i 2 N.x/: Hence, considering (29)
for t ￿ T; we can replace each v0







C .b ￿ 1/.Xt ￿ Xt￿1/ ￿ 0: (30)
Because E x does not converge in a ￿nite number of periods, Xt￿1 < X: Since x is not weakly
underblocked by Theorem 1 .i/, we have x 2 D: This implies X ￿ YN.x/; by Corollary 1.
Hence, Xt￿1 < YN.x/; and the concavity of each vi implies B > 0: Inequality (30) is thus
preserved when divided by B: Doing so, and using
max
s￿t




and the de￿nition of B; yields
max
s￿t













28Since Qt is nondecreasing in t; Qt ￿ 1 would imply Qs ￿ 1 for all s ￿ t: But then a recursive
application of (31) would prove that fXtg diverges, contrary to Xt ! X: Hence, Qt < 1 for all











From this, (8) is obtained by taking b ! maxi2N.x/ v0
i.X/: ￿
ProofofLemma6. Let x 2 E.￿; E N R/;andlet E x beanequilibriumpathof0.￿; E N R/converging
to x: Let m be the parameter given in (CY). De￿ne a path E z by letting the players move as in E x;
but only at dates that are multiples of m: That is, let zt D 0 for t D 0;:::;m ￿1; and for t ￿ m
let zt D xnkCi; where k and i are the unique integers satisfying k ￿ 0; i 2 N; and
.nk C i/m ￿ t < .nk C i C 1/m:
In E z player i moves only at dates .nk Ci/m; since in E x she moves only at dates nk Ci: The path
E z is feasible for E N; since i 2 N.nkCi/m:
Let O ￿ D ￿1=m: We show E z is an equilibrium path of 0.O ￿; E N/ by showing that it and O ￿ satisfy
(7) for any given i 2 N and t ￿ 1: This is true trivially, by (PS), if zs
i D z
t￿1
i for all s ￿ t: So





i : It is a multiple of m; say ￿ D pm:
Furthermore, z￿ D x p and z￿￿1 D zt￿1 D x p￿1: Observe that













￿i/ C O ￿
￿￿t











￿i/ C O ￿
￿￿t












￿i/ for each s D t;:::;￿ ￿1: (The
overall inequality holds trivially if ￿ D t:/ Hence, (7) holds if









which we now show. The de￿nitions of E z and O ￿ imply


























































￿i/; imply (32). ￿
The proof of Theorem 2 uses the following lemma.
Lemma A2. A feasible E x converging to a pro￿le x is an equilibrium path if and only if the
path E z de￿ned by zt D .xt
i/i2N.x/ for all t ￿ 0 is an equilibrium path of the game obtained by
deleting the players i = 2 N.x/:
Proof. If E x is an equilibrium path, it satis￿es (7). This implies E z satis￿es (7), with N replaced
by N.x/: Lemma 3 thus implies E z is an equilibrium path when the set of players is N.x/:
Conversely, suppose E z is an equilibrium path when the set of players is N.x/: Then (7) holds










￿i/ ￿ .1 ￿ ￿/
P
s￿t ￿s￿tui.xs/: This shows that (7) holds for all i 2 N;
proving by Lemma 3 that E x is an equilibrium path for N: ￿
Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma 6, it suf￿ces to prove the result for E N D E N R: Since the origin
is always an equilibrium limit pro￿le, we may assume x 6D 0: We construct a feasible path for
E N R that converges to x; and which is an equilibrium path for large ￿: By Lemma A2, we may
assume N.x/ D N; i.e., x ￿ 0:








for all i 2 N:
Note that 0 < di < v0
i.X/ for all i 2 N; since X < YN implies
P
j2N v0
j.X/ > 1: Let
N x ￿ x ￿ N ￿d;where N ￿ > 0 is small enough that N x ￿ 0: De￿ne another pro￿le O x ￿ x ￿ O ￿d;where


















we have u.N x/ ￿ u.O x/ ￿ u.x/; as well as 0 ￿ N x ￿ O x ￿ x:
De￿ne a sequence fxtg1




￿i : The rest of the proof consists of three steps.
Step 1. There exists a nondecreasing round-robin path fxtg1
tD0; and a discount factor ￿0 < 1;








Proof of Step 1. Since di < v0





< a < 1 (34)
for all i 2 N: De￿ne fxtg1














tD0 is a round-robin path that starts at N x and converges to x: Fix t > 0; and let i D t
.modn/: Let q ￿ 0 be the integer for which t D i C qn: At the end of period t ￿ 1; players
j D 1;:::;i ￿ 1 have raised their actions q C 1 times, and players j D i;:::;n have raised







x j ￿ N ￿aqC1dj for 1 ￿ j < i
x j ￿ N ￿aqdj for i ￿ j ￿ n:
(36)
This implies


















x j ￿ N ￿aqCkdj for 1 ￿ j ￿ i
x j ￿ N ￿aqCk￿1dj for i < j ￿ n
(38)
31and



































Each Ak is a sum over n consecutive dates, and player i moves only at the ￿rst of them, t C.k￿
1/n. Hence, for each of these dates s; xs
i D x
tC.k￿1/n









































where the inequality follows from Xs ￿ XtC.k￿1/n for s ￿ tC.k￿1/n: Using now the concavity



















This expression can be bounded from below. From (37) and (39) we have































From this, 1 ￿ ak > a.1 ￿ ak￿1/; and 1 ￿ ak￿1 > a.1 ￿ ak￿1/, we obtain














D N ￿aqC1.1 ￿ ak￿1/:




i D N ￿aq ￿
1 ￿ ak￿
di: Consequently,












This and (34) imply










































.1 C " ￿ a/
￿
:
Thus, A ￿ 0 for ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ .1 C "/￿1=n: As ￿0 does not depend on t; Step 1 is proved. ￿
Step 2. There exists a ￿nite, nonincreasing round-robin path fxkgK
kD0 such that x0 D N x; xK D 0;
and u.xk/ ￿ u.O x/ for each k D 0;:::; K:
Proof of Step 2. Let x0 ￿ N x: To de￿ne x1; let x1
￿1 D x0
￿1: Let x1
1 D 0 if u1.0;x0
￿1/ ￿ u1.O x/:
Otherwise, let x1
1 be the Q x1 for which u1.Q x1;x0
￿1/ D u1.O x/I this equation has a unique solution,
and it is in the interval .0;x0
1/; since u1.￿;x0
￿1/ is monotonic and u1.x0/ < u1.O x/ < u1.0;x0
￿1/:
Note that 0 ￿ x1 ￿ x0; u1.x1/ ￿ u1.O x/; and by (PS), u j.x1/ < u j.O x/ for j 6D i:
Now suppose that for some k ￿ 1; pro￿les x0;:::;xk have been de￿ned, and they satisfy







￿1/ ￿ ui.O x/: Otherwise, let x
kC1





for which ui.Q xi;xk
￿i/ D
ui.O x/: By (PS), we have u.xkC1/ ￿ u.O x/:
This de￿nes a nonincreasing and bounded round-robin path fxkg1
kD0: Let z be its limit. We
have z ￿ xk for all k > 0; and u.z/ ￿ u.O x/:
Assume z > 0: In addition, assume ui.z/ < ui.O x/ for some i 2 N.z/: By continuity,
Q xi 2 .0;zi/ exists such that ui.Q xi;z￿i/ < ui.O x/: Since xk ! z; there exists k0 such that
ui.Q xi;xk
￿i/ < ui.O x/ for all k > k0: But then, the construction of the path implies that for any
k > k0 such that i D k C 1 .modn/; x
kC1
i < Q xi < zi: This contradicts zi ￿ x
kC1
i : Thus,
ui.z/ D ui.O x/ for all i 2 N.z/: Since z < O x; this shows that N.z/ weakly underblocks O x: This
contradicts O x 2 Ds: We conclude that z D 0:
33As O x 2 Ds; no singleton weakly underblocks O x: Since 0 ￿ O x; this implies u.0/ ￿ u.O x/:
Thus, K0 exists such that ui.0;xk
￿i/ < u.O x/ for all k ￿ K0 and i 2 N: Therefore, by the
construction of the path, K ￿ K0 C n exists such that xK D 0: ￿
Step 3. There exists ￿ < 1 such that for all ￿ 2 .￿;1/; x 2 E.￿; E N R/:
Proof of Step 3. Reverse the round-robin path obtained in Step 2, and add enough copies of
0 to its beginning and N x to its end to obtain a ￿nite, nondecreasing round-robin path, fztgT
tD0;
from z0 D 0 to zT D N x; that has player 1 moving ￿rst .z1
￿1 D 0/; and player n moving last
.z
T￿1
￿n D N x￿n/: To the end of fztgT
tD0 add the round-robin path obtained in Step 1: zTCs D xs for
all integers s ￿ 0: This yields a path E z D fztg1
tD0 that is feasible for E N R and converges to x:
Let t ￿ 1 and i 2 N R












￿i/ ￿ ui.zt/ ￿ ui.O x/ < ui.x/:
Therefore, since .1 ￿ ￿/
P
s￿t ￿s￿tui.zs/ ! ui.x/ as ￿ ! 1; there exists ￿t < 1 such that (40)
holds for ￿ > ￿t: We thus have (40) for all t ￿ 1, i 2 N R
t ; and ￿ > ￿ ￿ max.￿0;￿1;:::;￿T/.
Lemma 3 now implies x 2 E.￿; E N R/ if ￿ 2 .￿;1/: ￿
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